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Drawing on the European Commission’s Autumn forecasts, I estimate 
fiscal reaction functions with four different information sets, ranging 
from budget plans to final outcomes. I also analyse deviations from 
plans during budget implementation. In a panel of 15 EU countries 
from 1987 to 2006, moving from plans to final data generally weakens 
the counter-cyclicality of budget balances and expenditures (though 
not of revenues), and reinforces electoral effects. Deviations from 
plans play a negligible role in the former finding, as they are often a-
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This paper analyses fiscal behaviour in the light of alternative information sets, ranging from 
the data available to policymakers when budgets are drafted (which in the literature is often 
referred to as “real-time data”) to the latest release of fiscal and macroeconomic time series 
covering past years. Fiscal reaction functions are estimated for the widely used cyclically-
adjusted primary balance (CAPB), but also for its components on the revenue and expenditure 
sides. A particular emphasis is placed on the response to cyclical conditions, found to be the 
feature of fiscal behaviour which varies the most across different information sets; but other 
aspects of fiscal policy, such as the presence of opportunistic electoral effects, are considered 
as well. Further, I investigate to what extent deviations from fiscal plans during budget 
implementation play a role in explaining differences between results with ex-ante or with ex-
post data. 
 
Fiscal policy cyclicality has been under close scrutiny in recent years. Part of the interest in the 
topic stems from the stabilization role of fiscal policy, arguably made more important in a 
monetary union context (due to the possibility of asymmetric shocks), and intensely appealed 
to in the current crisis. However, cyclicality also matters from a more long-run perspective: the 
well-known problem of “pro-cyclicality in good times” poses a threat to fiscal sustainability, 
insofar as the accumulation of public debt in a recession is not (sufficiently) reversed during 
the following economic expansion. 
 
Over the past decade several studies have highlighted the importance of analyzing monetary 
policy rules on the basis of real-time data – i.e., information (estimates or forecasts) actually 
available at the time of monetary policy decision-making (e.g. Orphanides, 2001). More 
recently, this informational problem has also been taken on board as regards fiscal reaction 
functions. However, while in the case of monetary policy data revisions are confined to the 
macroeconomic variables to which interest rates respond (such as inflation or the output gap), 
fiscal indicators themselves are exposed to uncertainty. The latter stems from a variety of 
sources: for instance, misperceived macroeconomic conditions (which lead to revisions in 
cyclically-adjusted fiscal variables if potential output is reassessed) and departures from fiscal 
plans at the implementation stage. The implications of evolving information sets are therefore 
even wider in fiscal than in monetary policy. 
  
As far as the literature on fiscal policy in real time is concerned, a number of early 
contributions (Forni and Momigliano, 2004; Golinelli and Momigliano, 2006) estimate   2
reaction functions where the use of real-time data is limited to the output gap and, in some 
cases, to a few other right-hand-side variables (e.g. the lagged primary balance). More recent 
papers – Cimadomo (2008), Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008), Beetsma and Giuliodori (2008), 
Bernoth  et al. (2008) – extend the use of real-time information to the dependent variable 
(usually the CAPB), and thus ensure that the different variables in a fiscal reaction function 
belong to a common information set. Most of these studies focus on fiscal cyclicality, and 
share the conclusion that fiscal policy responds more counter-cyclically to real-time output 
gaps than to ex-post ones. These divergent results between ex-ante and ex-post data are 
accounted for by the fact that data revisions tend to move the output gap and the CAPB in 
opposite directions, and thus increase pro-cyclicality. The latter is hence a problem of 
“misinformation rather than malintention” (Bernoth et al., 2008, p. 23). 
 
To avoid the possible window dressing of national budgets, all the abovementioned studies use 
December issues of the OECD Economic Outlook as the source for real-time data. In this 
paper, I draw on the European Commission’s Autumn forecasts instead. There are a number of 
motivations for this choice. The Commission started to publish output gap and CAPB forecasts 
later than the OECD, but was first to decompose budget balance projections into revenues and 
expenditures. By circumventing the absence of an explicit output gap forecast with a proxy 
based on GDP growth, I am able to work with a longer sample (starting in 1987 rather than in 
1995, as is the case in most previous contributions) and, more importantly, to study real-time 
fiscal behaviour on the revenue and expenditure sides, instead of considering the budget 
balance alone. Using Commission forecasts also makes it possible to check to what extent 
previous findings are specific to OECD figures; as shown by Golinelli and Momigliano (2008), 
cyclicality results can be affected by the source of fiscal data.  
 
This paper adds to the literature on fiscal policy in real time in two further aspects. First, I 
study whether deviations from fiscal plans during budgetary implementation help explain 
differences between ex-ante and ex-post policy. For instance, a strong pro-cyclical behaviour 
in those deviations would contribute (with some malintention involved…) to the general 
pattern of cyclicality findings in previous studies. Yet, to my knowledge, an explicit analysis of 
updates to original fiscal plans has so far only been undertaken in Beetsma and Giuliodori 
(2008). Second, the treatment of alternative information sets is more comprehensive than in 
previous contributions, as reaction functions are estimated for (i) one-year-ahead forecasts, (ii) 
current-year estimates, (iii) provisional outcomes and (iv) final outcomes. 
   3
In a sample of 15 European Union (EU) countries in the 1987-2006 period, I find anti-
cyclicality to wane from plans to final outcomes, and trace this phenomenon to public 
expenditure. Electoral effects also vary across information sets: they seem absent from planned 
policy, but become apparent as soon as one moves to current-year estimates. Updates in fiscal 
plans at the implementation stage are mostly a-cyclical, and thus of second-order importance to 
overall fiscal cyclicality; but are found to be highly responsive to parliamentary elections. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the dataset and 
reports some summary statistics on data revisions. Section 3 presents the specification of fiscal 
reaction functions and the ensuing estimation results for alternative information sets. Section 4 
deals with deviations from fiscal plans during budget implementation. The final section offers 
some concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. DATA, NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY 
 







denote the value of variable X in country i and year t, as released in the European Commission 
Autumn forecasts of year t+s. Each issue of these forecasts constitutes a different data vintage. 
The status of data is given by index s. For instance, s = -1 indicates forecast status, i.e., 
forecasts for year t prepared in the Autumn of t-1; s = 0 implies current-year estimates; and s = 
1 stands for (generally) provisional figures, released in the following Autumn. 
 
Data vintages used in this study run from 1986 to 2007, defining a window of 20 years (1987-
2006) for which forecasts, estimates and provisional figures are available. The latest vintage 
(Autumn 2007) also yields what will be called final data (i.e., conventional time series, with 
values for different years from the same release), which for comparability has also been 
collected for the 1987-2006 time span
1. As for country coverage, the sample includes the 15 
EU members prior to the 2004 enlargement (EU15 henceforth), though most figures for 
Austria, Finland and Sweden are only available from 1995 onwards
2. 
                                                 
1 Sometimes referred to as data of final status, though in this case it is t+s, rather than s, which stays constant. 
Notice further that for year 2006 provisional and final figures are actually the same. 
2 It would be possible to consider some vintages before 1986 as well, but they contain information for still fewer 
countries.   4
 
From each vintage, 5 fiscal variables are collected (all in % of GDP): the budget balance (B), 
total revenue (R), total expenditure (E), interest payments (I) and public debt (D). Before 2000, 
variables I and D were often not reported in the issue of European Economy devoted to the 
presentation of Autumn forecasts, but could be retrieved from different issues of that 
publication making explicit reference to the respective Autumn forecasts as their source
3. I 
further collect from each vintage a time series of real GDP growth from 1960 onwards, which 
is used for output gap estimation as described below. The Appendix deals with more detailed 
data management issues, such as missing values and consistency checks. 
 
The European Commission only started to publish forecasts for cyclically-adjusted balances 
(CAB) and for output gaps in 1997 and in 2000, respectively. Further, the methodology of 
cyclical adjustment has not remained constant
4. Taking account of these limitations, I have 
decided to construct estimates of output gaps for all the vintages in the sample through a 
uniform methodology based on GDP growth (a similar approach is followed by Gollinelli and 
Momigliano, 2006). The ensuing gaps are then used in the cyclical adjustment of fiscal 
variables. 
 
Gaps are based on the Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF) filter, since its end-of-sample properties are 
arguably better than those of popular alternatives, such as the Baxter-King or Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filters (see Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003). For vintage t+s, I construct an index of real 
GDP from 1960 to year t+s+2 (using the time series of growth rates), and run the CF filter to 
estimate the output gap until year t+s+1
5. I then derive the cyclically-adjusted revenue (CAR), 
primary expenditure (CAPE) and primary balance (CAPB) – all in percentage of potential 
output – following the method of the Commission (European Commission, 2006, pp. 115-119). 
This approach subsumes the elasticities (with respect to the output gap) of the several 
cyclically-sensitive items into two budgetary sensitivity parameters, one for revenue (ε
R) and 
the other for expenditure(ε
E)
6. Formally: 
                                                 
3 For instance, until 2001 Autumn forecasts were published in Supplement A to European Economy. Other issues 
of European Economy drawing on those forecasts include the so-called Annual Economic Reports. 
4 For instance, in the Autumn 2000 and Autumn 2001 vintages CAB figures were based on output gaps estimated 
through the Hodrick-Prescott filter, while in the Autumn 2002 reported CAB data were computed using production 
function-based gaps.  
5 The filter is applied to log(GDP) and assumes that cyclical fluctuations correspond to the 2-10 years frequency 
range. Before 1990 Autumn forecasts did not include year t+s+2, and thus the t+s+1 gap had to be estimated with 
a time series ending in that same year. While acknowledging that it would be desirable to extend further the series 
for GDP, I wish to avoid arbitrary (though commonly used) extension procedures, such as extrapolation based on 
ARIMA models.  
6 For simplicity these parameters are only allowed to vary across countries, though in reality they also change over 
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For consistency with the OECD Economic Outlook, which has been the source of real-time 
fiscal data in previous studies, proceeds from UMTS licenses (recorded as negative 
expenditure) are excluded when computing variables CAPE and CAPB
7. As is well known, 
many other one-off and temporary measures have taken place in EU countries, which for data 
limitations are not netted out above, but will be dealt with in the following sections. 
 
To put into perspective this paper’s output gap estimates, Table 1 provides a comparison with 
two alternative measures computed by the Commission, one based on the HP filter and the 
other on a production function (PF) approach (all three estimates refer to final data, i.e., from 
the Autumn 2007 vintage). The CF-based gap has a much smaller standard deviation, taking 
values that in absolute terms are often just over half of those obtained by alternative methods. 
However, it remains highly correlated with its counterparts (correlation coefficients of 0.76 and 
0.77 with HP-based and PF-based gaps, respectively), thus capturing essentially the same 
cyclical patterns. 
 
Output gaps and fiscal variables are subject to revisions in successive data vintages. Gaps may 
change due to unexpected developments in actual GDP or to reassessments of an economy’s 
potential output. Revisions in cyclically-adjusted fiscal aggregates may correspond to 
differences between planned and implemented policy, to late disclosure of fiscal outcomes, to 
methodological changes or to revisions in the output gap itself. For a given variable Xi,t, I 
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implicit sensitivity parameters for each country and year, and checked that ignoring the time variation has a 
negligible impact on results (Additional Appendix, Table A.1). 
7 This has required collecting UMTS figures from several editions of the Autumn forecasts (as for the other fiscal 
variables), and in particular distinguishing forecast from realized values.   6
Table 2 reports mean absolute revisions for two choices of vintages: the difference between 









, ). As far as fiscal variables are concerned, one expects the former difference to be 
largely (though not exclusively) induced by deviations from fiscal plans during budget 
implementation, either in response to cyclical developments or to other motivations; whereas 
the latter difference should mainly be driven by other factors, such as methodological changes 
or output gap revisions. 
 
In line with previous studies, Table 2 shows that data revisions are substantial, both for output 
gaps and for fiscal variables
8. One also observes that, in an overwhelming majority of cases, 
revisions from current-year estimates to final data are larger than revisions from forecasts to 
estimates. Further, revenues and expenditures tend to undergo larger revisions than the budget 
balance, especially from estimates to final data, which suggests an enhanced vulnerability to 
methodological changes. 
  
To conclude this section, Table 3 presents correlations between revisions in the output gap and 
revisions in fiscal variables. The latter are taken in first differences, rather than in levels, so as 
to minimize the impact of methodological changes. In the case of revisions from forecasts to 
estimates, correlations tend to be rather small, suggesting a fairly muted response to new 
information about cyclical conditions during budget implementation. However, as one moves 
from current-year estimates to final data, correlations become somewhat stronger for variables 
CAPB and CAPE, implying that cyclicality patterns may vary with data status. Both issues will 
be taken up in what follows. 
                                                 
8 When compared with mean absolute revisions reported by Cimadomo (2008) or Bernoth et al. (2008), who use 
OECD data, figures in Table 2 tend to be smaller for output gaps (for the reasons presented before), but also for 
the  CAPB. However, the comparison is hampered by differences in samples and (sometimes) in the precise 
definition of revisions.   7
3. PLANNED VERSUS EX-POST FISCAL POLICY 
 
3.1. Empirical specification 
 
I estimate fiscal reaction functions of the form 
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where FV is the fiscal variable of interest (CAPB, CAR or CAPE, always relative to potential 
output), GAP is the Christiano-Fitzgerald output gap, D is the debt-to-GDP ratio, and x is a 
vector of variables which control for electoral effects and for the impact of European fiscal 
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Dummy variables are defined for parliamentary elections, both considering all such elections 
(variable ELEC) and disaggregating them into regular elections (held in the final 6 months of a 
full term; variable ELECR) and early elections (variable ELECE). I draw on data compiled by 
Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) for 11 Euro Area countries and kindly made available by the 
authors, extending their sample with similar criteria and primary sources. 
 
As for European fiscal rules, variables MAAS and SGP intend to capture the need for fiscal 
adjustment in the run-up to monetary union and under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
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+ + for Euro Area 
countries, 3 , − <
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t i B  and t between 1992 and 1996; and equals zero elsewhere. As regards the 
latter,  2 ) 3 ( , , + =
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s t
t i B SGP  for Euro Area countries,  3 , − <
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t i B  and t from 1997 onwards; and 
takes value zero elsewhere
9. More negative values indicate a stronger need for consolidation. 









− 1 , ), to capture fiscal conditions at the time of preparing the budget for the 
following year. 
 
Equation (5) includes country fixed effects (ci), but not time fixed effects. Including the latter 
would, in my view, fundamentally change the interpretation of the cyclicality parameter (β1), 
since the coefficients of time effects would tend to capture fiscal responses to common shocks. 
 
                                                 
9 In the case of Greece, timings are adjusted: in the denominator of MAAS 1997 becomes 1999 and this variable is 
defined for t=1992,…,1998, whereas SGP can take non-zero values from 1999 onwards. Variables identical or 
close to these can be found in Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) or in Beetsma and Giuliodori (2008).   8
All variables in the fiscal reaction function are from the same vintage, hence minimizing the 
risk that the relationship between the regressand and the regressors is blurred by 
methodological changes. A common vintage also implies a common information set, i.e., a 
contemporaneous assessment of fiscal and macroeconomic conditions. Four versions of 
equation (5) are estimated, corresponding to differences in data status. Estimation with s = -1 
corresponds to the analysis of planned fiscal policy; s = 0 yields an assessment of fiscal 
behaviour on the basis of current-year estimates, already incorporating information which 
becomes available during budget implementation; s = 1 adds one more year to the information 
set, studying fiscal policy with provisional data (available in the following Autumn); finally, 
t+s = 2007 corresponds to the conventional use of ex-post data, i.e., of the latest available 
information
10. From this point of view, our paper is more encompassing than previous 





I first analyse results obtained for variable CAPB, and then turn to its disaggregation into 
revenues and expenditures. In each case fiscal reaction functions were estimated both by least 




− 1 , , to avoid endogeneity problems
12) and by 
GMM. 
 
Table 4 reports least squares results for the CAPB. In line with most of the literature, the anti-
cyclicality of fiscal policy tends to wane as one moves from plans to final outcomes. Planned 
fiscal policy is strongly counter-cyclical, whereas policy assessed on the basis of final 
outcomes is essentially a-cyclical. The output gap coefficients are numerically bigger than in 
previous studies, which mainly stems from the fact that gaps in this paper are themselves 
smaller (in absolute terms)
13. When considering separately the reactions to positive and 
negative output gaps
14, it emerges that the decline in counter-cyclicality is somewhat stronger 
                                                 
10 In an attempt to align the electoral dummies with the remaining variables as far as the availability of 
information is concerned, I use ELECR with s = -1 (i.e., planned fiscal policy does not take early elections into 
account), and ELEC in the remaining cases. 
11 For instance, Cimadomo (2008) compares planned and final data, while Bernoth et al. (2008) use current-year 
estimates versus final data (with planned data used for robustness checks).  
12 Cimadomo (2008) and Turrini (2008), among others, also take this route. 
13 On the basis of final data, I have checked that fiscal reaction functions are extremely similar whether one uses 
the CF gap or the gap estimates produced by the Commission, the main difference pertaining to the gap 
coefficient, which is numerically larger with CF figures (Additional Appendix, Table A.1). 
14 Two new variables were created, each obtained through the product of GAP by an indicator variable taking 
value one when the gap is positive (negative), and zero otherwise.   9
and “faster” (in the sense of becoming apparent as soon as data status changes from forecasts 
to estimates) in the case of positive gaps. 
 
As regards other policy determinants, variable CAPB is found to respond to debt ratios in a 
stabilizing way (though at the planning stage this feedback seems weaker and with only 
borderline statistical significance), and to be highly persistent. As in Cimadomo (2008), 
persistence is highest with planned data
15, which may be a consequence of the “no policy 
change” assumption in the preparation of fiscal forecasts. Further, the Maastricht (MAAS) 
variable displays a negative and highly significant coefficient, capturing consolidation efforts 
by prospective euro area members in the run-up to the single currency. This contrasts with the 
reaction to excessive deficits under the SGP, which is discernible at the planning stage but 
completely vanishes with latest available data. Finally, the estimations reveal strong electoral 
effects (a deterioration of the fiscal balance in election years), with the notable exception of 
planned fiscal policy, where they seem completely absent
16. 
 
I now examine the contributions of cyclically-adjusted revenues (Table 5) and expenditures 
(Table 6) to the above findings. The most striking conclusion is that the fading away of 
counter-cyclicality as we move from one-year-ahead forecasts to final data is entirely an 
expenditure-driven phenomenon. Revenues remain anti-cyclical across data of different status, 
and output gap coefficients, though generally small, even display a modest upward trend as s 
increases, most evident in the case of positive gaps. As for expenditures, planned policy is also 
clearly anti-cyclical, but output gap coefficients decrease (in absolute terms) and eventually 




Policy persistence is even stronger for revenues and expenditures than for the CAPB (a result in 
line with Turrini, 2008), and, as before, is highest for planned data. The feedback on debt is 
                                                 
15 These estimates should be regarded with prudence, as the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 
particularly vulnerable to the well-known bias problem when estimating by least squares dynamic fixed effects 
models with a “small” number of time observations (see e.g. Judson and Owen, 1999; Bruno, 2005). The fact that 
the bias is much less severe for the other coefficients helps to explain why the least squares dummy variable 
estimator remains widely used in the empirical analysis of fiscal reaction functions. 
16 Studies using OECD one-year-ahead forecasts sometimes find statistical significance for an electoral dummy, 
though often only at the 10% level (e.g. Cimadomo, 2008; Giuliodori and Beetsma, 2008; Beetsma and 
Giuliodori, 2008). Working with OECD current-year estimates, Bernoth et al. (2008) report a larger and more 
significant coefficient. It then seems possible that OECD data yield a pattern of electoral effects across 
information sets similar to this paper, though in a mitigated form. Needless to say, different samples also limit 
comparability. 
17 When considering separately the four quartiles of the output gap distribution, pro-cyclicality with final data is 
most clear-cut in the 4
th quartile (Additional Appendix, Table A.2)  – i.e., in really good times…   10
more visible (numerically and statistically) on the expenditure side. Adjustment efforts 
prompted by European fiscal rules seem to have taken place mainly through higher revenues. 
As for the CAPB, opportunistic electoral effects are not discernible in planned fiscal policy. In 
estimates, provisional data and final data, those effects tend to be present on both sides of the 
budget, though often with weaker statistical significance than in the CAPB reaction functions
18. 
 
Bernoth et al. (2008) argue that the contrast between ex-ante anti-cyclicality and ex-post a-
cyclicality (or even pro-cyclicality) is due to errors in assessing the output gap in real time. If 
new information induces an output gap revision of a given sign (say, an increase), then the 
CAPB will simultaneously undergo a revision of the opposite sign (a deterioration, in the 
example), hence increasing the degree of pro-cyclicality. Our results for revenues and 
expenditures lend support to this explanation. Revisions in the output gap give rise to a 
revision of the same sign in variable CAPE, but have almost no impact on CAR (recall that 
both are ratios to potential output), since the output elasticity of revenues is close to unity 
(implying that, in equation (1) above, the sensitivity parameter ε
R is close to R divided by 100). 
Therefore, one would expect expenditures to become more pro-cyclical as new information is 
taken on board, with no similar effect on the revenue side. This entirely conforms to the results 
in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
All the previous reaction functions have also been estimated with GMM, taking the 
contemporary output gap as a regressor and instrumenting it with its own lag (from the same 
data vintage) and a proxy of the lagged international cycle (defined for each country as a GDP-
weighted average of the lagged gap of the other countries in the sample)
19. Results are given in 
Tables 7 to 9, and confirm in qualitative terms all conclusions based on least squares 
estimation. While the coefficients of explanatory variables other than the output gap remain 
fairly stable across estimation methodologies, parameter estimates referring to the output gap 
tend to be numerically larger (in absolute terms) with GMM, and there is a general loss of 
accuracy in the estimation, especially when considering separately positive and negative gaps. 
  
Further, I have checked whether one-off and temporary measures (one-offs for conciseness), 
which some countries have resorted to abundantly, distort to any significant degree coefficients 
                                                 
18  I have checked that when excluding from the sample one country at a time all results remain qualitatively 
unchanged, and indeed coefficient estimates generally record little variation.   
19 In the case of positive versus negative gaps, the lags of the respective variables have been used as instruments, 
thus yielding a total of three instruments including the international cycle. In the computation of the latter, GDP 
weights are PPS-adjusted, and the three late entrants to the EU15 (Austria, Finland and Sweden) are excluded 
from the averages.    11
in fiscal reaction functions. Though ideally one would like to handle all one-offs in the way 
UMTS proceeds were controlled for, there are both conceptual and informational obstacles. On 
the one hand, there is no clear definition of what constitutes a one-off, and indeed the most 
widely used sources for the budget effects of such measures present important discrepancies 
(see the next footnote). On the other hand, identifying final values in not enough for our 
purposes, as one would need data of different status as well (e.g. one-year-ahead forecasts or 
current-year estimates). In the light of these difficulties, my approach has been to exclude all 
observations corresponding to countries and years where one-offs equal to or above a certain 
threshold – set at 1% of GDP – have been identified
20. Previous conclusions continue to hold, 
though with some numerical and statistical weakening of variable MAAS coefficients 
(especially with final data, and on the revenue side – Additional Appendix, Tables A.3 to A.5), 
which suggests that one-offs may have played a role in the pre-1999 adjustment efforts. 
 
  
4. FISCAL RESPONSES DURING BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION 
 
4.1. Empirical specification 
 
I now study how governments deviate from budgetary plans – or, put differently, update those 
plans – during the implementation stage. Drawing on Beetsma and Giuliodori (2008) and 
extending their specification, I estimate the following model: 
 





















− − δ σ ρ ρ ρ    (6) 
 
The dependent variable is the update in the fiscal stance, measured as the difference between 
current-year estimates and one-year-ahead forecasts (recall the notation in section 2). On the 
right-hand side one finds the updates of the six variables included in the fiscal reaction function 
(5): the output gap, the lagged fiscal variable of interest, the lagged debt ratio, the holding of 
elections (whose update is assimilated to early elections), MAAS and SGP (the last three 












t i SGP ). 
Several of these updates consist in new information about year t-1 which only becomes 
                                                 
20 Identification of one-offs is based on ex-post values and uses the following sources: from 1993 to 1999, Koen 
and van den Noord (2005, Table 5, p. 15); from 2000 to 2002, European Commission (2004, Table II.4, p. 85); 
from 2003 onwards, AMECO database, Autumn 2007 release. Comparison between sources (made possible by 
the fact that the first two also cover some further years) reveals sizeable discrepancies, even when numbers are 
compiled by the same institution (second and third sources). Though set at a high level, the chosen threshold 
implies a loss of 35 observations (also due to the presence of lagged variables).   12
available in the course of year t (e.g. a worse-than-expected fiscal position, possibly in 
violation of European-level rules), and which could prompt a within-year fiscal response. 
 
Equation (6) also considers the possibility of systematic patterns in fiscal deviations from 
plans, in response to information already available at the time of budgeting. These deviations 
could correspond to policy changes which were not announced at the stage of budget 
preparation (and hence not taken into account by the Commission in the Autumn forecasts), but 
which still take place in some predictable way, either in the form of new policy measures or 
through changes in the strictness of implementation of existing provisions. For this purpose, 




t i GAP ) and the dummy variable for 
regular elections (ELECP). 
 
Most variables in equation (6) involve data from two different vintages, and are therefore 
vulnerable to methodological changes. From this perspective, the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable is particularly important, as changes in accounting criteria from the Autumn 
of year t-1 to the Autumn of year t should have a broadly similar impact on the levels of fiscal 
variables in both years. It turns out that in all cases one could statistically accept the restriction 
ρ2 = 1, the dependent variable thus becoming  
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i.e., the update in the annual change (rather than in the level) of FV. Therefore equation (6) 
simplifies to 
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t i GAP ) and the update in the GDP-weighted average of other countries’ 
gaps in year t
21. There could be objections to the second instrument on simultaneity grounds, 
since fiscal policy in large economies could contemporaneously affect cyclical conditions in 
partner countries. However, due to the lags involved in the international transmission of 
effects, this should be less of a problem here than if one used the year t international cycle as 
an instrument in equation (5) – and, in more practical terms, using the update in the 
                                                 
21 Beetsma and Giuliodori (2008) also use these instruments, as well as interest rate updates.   13
international cycle of year t-1 instead yielded no consistent improvement in terms of Hansen J 
test results. As before, I have also experimented with separate variables for positive and 
negative gap updates (i.e., improvements versus deteriorations in the assessment of year t 
cyclical conditions), instrumented with the respective lags. 
 
In this section, the analysis is based on results obtained with the exclusion of one-offs 
(performed as before). Judging from the experience of UMTS licenses, one-offs are often 
unaccounted for at the budget preparation stage, and hence responsible for sizeable deviations 
between implemented and planned fiscal policy – which could generate outliers and hence 
distort coefficient estimates. 
 
Results for CAPB updates are given in Table 10, where the first two columns exclude 
responses to pre-existing information. Fiscal policy does not seem to react in a statistical 
significant way to updates in cyclical conditions, nor to revisions in lagged debt ratios. On the 
other hand, there is a marked response to early elections, which on average induce 
discretionary policy to be loosened by 0.5 p.p. of GDP. Further, worse-than-expected breaches 
of the deficit limit in the years preceding monetary union seem to have given rise to a within-
year correction effort of a magnitude roughly comparable to the deterioration itself
22. 
 
There is also evidence of systematic patterns in fiscal updates, both in line with opportunistic 
political business cycles and as a response to cyclical conditions. Regular elections have lead to 
expansionary updates, though not as large as in the case of early elections. A more benign 
behaviour, in the form of an anti-cyclical fiscal response, is observable when the economy is 
expected to be producing below potential. Overall, results contrast with those of Beetsma and 
Giuliodori (2008), who find for a group of 14 EU countries a pro-cyclical response to output 
gap updates, but no significant electoral effects. 
 
Decomposing fiscal updates into their revenue and expenditure parts proved harder in 
econometric terms (with problems in the validity of instruments when considering positive 
versus negative gap updates), and with less suggestive results. As Tables 11 and 12 show, there 
is some evidence of a pro-cyclical reaction of taxes to gap updates, which contrasts with a 
stabilizing response to the output gap forecast. One also observes that revenues strongly react 
to “bad news” about worsened violations of the SGP in the preceding year. No opportunistic 
                                                 
22 Adjusted for the number of years left until 1997 – recall the definition of variable MAAS.   14
electoral effects reach statistical significance on the revenue side, whereas on the expenditure 
side the only significant coefficient precisely concerns the response to regular elections
23. 
 
Overall, while sometimes one can identify which side of the budget accounts for a given CAPB 
result (e.g. expansionary updates in response to regular elections take place through increased 
outlays), in other cases tracing the origin of an aggregate fiscal response becomes very difficult 
(e.g. as with early elections). One possible explanation is that what matters most is the 
production of the aggregate response itself, and not its composition in terms of budget items; 
depending on specific circumstances, policymakers might sometimes resort to expenditure, and 
sometimes to revenue, in order to achieve a given fiscal balance outcome. 
 
A final line of comment to empirical results in this section concerns their consistency with 
those of section 3, and in particular whether they can bridge any gaps between fiscal reaction 
functions with planned data (s = -1) and with current-year estimates (s = 0). In the case of 
elections, the answer is clearly positive. Opportunistic fiscal updates during budget 
implementation provide a plausible explanation to the contrast between the absence of electoral 
effects in fiscal forecasts and their emergence when the information set is enlarged to estimates 
(a contrast most visible for variables CAPB and CAPE). As for the cyclical stance of fiscal 
policy, the answer is less clear-cut, largely because the difference between cyclicality results 
with  s = -1 and with s = 0 is much milder itself. In any case, fiscal updates during 
implementation cannot account for the contrast between anti-cyclicality in fiscal plans and a-





In this paper, fiscal reactions functions were estimated for (i) one-year-ahead budgetary plans, 
(ii) current-year estimates of fiscal outturns, (ii) provisional fiscal outturns, compiled in the 
year following budget implementation and (iv) final (i.e., latest-release) fiscal data. In each of 
the four cases, the dependent and explanatory variables are from the same vintage, and hence 
correspond to a common information set. I also estimate empirical models for deviations from 
fiscal plans (defined as current-year estimates minus one-year-ahead forecasts), as these can 
potentially help explain why results differ with alternative information sets. Drawing on data 
from the European Commission’s Autumn forecasts, I take as dependent variable the CAPB, 
                                                 
23 As in section 3, on the whole results are robust to the exclusion of individual countries from the sample.   15
but also cyclically-adjusted revenues and primary expenditures. The sample runs from 1987 to 
2006 and comprises 15 EU countries.  
 
Two features of fiscal behaviour are found to vary significantly across information sets: 
cyclicality and the response to upcoming elections. As regards the former, fiscal plans are 
found to be anti-cyclical, either assessed on the basis of balances, revenue or expenditure. The 
same holds for current-year estimates and for provisional data, though the anti-cyclicality of 
balances and expenditures becomes somewhat weaker, particularly in response to positive 
output gaps. However, as one moves to final outcomes, only revenues remain consistently 
counter-cyclical; the CAPB becomes a-cyclical, and there is even some evidence of 
expenditure pro-cyclicality, especially in good times.  
 
As in previous studies, fiscal plans are therefore more anti-cyclical than the ensuing outcomes. 
Disaggregating balances into revenues and expenditures makes it possible to trace this 
phenomenon to the spending side of the budget. In turn, this finding lends support to an 
explanation based on successive reassessments of an economy’s cyclical position, with 
revisions to potential output playing a major role, which concomitantly affect the CAPB and 
cyclically-adjusted primary expenditure (as a ratio to potential GDP), but have only second-
order effects on cyclically-adjusted revenue (since its output elasticity is close to unity). An 
alternative explanation would be pro-cyclical deviations from plans during budget 
implementation; but it received scant empirical support, as those deviations were found to be 
mostly a-cyclical. 
 
Opportunistic expansionary effects in electoral years were not detected for planned fiscal 
policy, but were conspicuous in all outturn data. Updates in fiscal plans during implementation 
help explain this pattern, since they display strong electoral effects, which are largest for early 
elections but also sizeable for regular ones. Opportunistic behaviour can be found on both sides 
of the budget (except, again, at the planning stage), though with some more visibility in public 
expenditure. However, statistical significance is highest and most consistent as regards the 
CAPB, suggesting that revenues and expenditures may be used as substitutes in the process of 
loosening policy. 
 
While results on fiscal cyclicality are a reminder of the difficulties in conducting discretionary 
counter-cyclical policy, the prevalence of opportunistic responses to upcoming elections 
stresses the need to reinforce fiscal rules and institutions at the national level. In this respect, 
investigating the role played by existing frameworks provides an avenue for future research.   16
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APPENDIX: DATA MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
 
 
1. Minimizing lost observations 
 
To minimize the number of lost observations due to missing values, I have on a few occasions 
resorted to data from the closest available vintage (i.e., the one immediately before, or after, 
the vintage lacking some variables), or to accounting identities. Hence: 
 
•   In the Autumn 1986, Autumn 1995 and Autumn 1997 vintages, the time series for GDP 
growth were completed back to 1960 with values from issues of European Economy 
published in the previous Spring or Summer; 
 
•   In the Autumn 1995 and Autumn 1997 vintages, values for interest payments (I) were 
taken from issues of European Economy published in the following Spring
24; 
 
•   In the Autumn 1986 and Autumn 1987 vintages, total revenue was derived from the 
budget balance and total expenditure (R = B + E). 
 
 
2. Remaining missing values 
 
Econometric estimations in this paper generally present a number of observations somewhat 
below the maximum level of 300 (15 countries, 20 years). By far the most important cause of 
lost observations is the later accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the EU (losses of 27, 
24 and 21 observations for s = -1, s = 0 and s = 1, respectively). A few further losses (for s = 0 
and s = 1) correspond to accounting discrepancies between B, E and R, in which case I dropped 
from the sample the observations involved. In very rare cases, some variables were literally 
missing for specific years in the original sources, or it was impossible to complete some series 
backwards with ESA79 figures (for final data; see below). 
 
 
3. Issues pertaining to final data 
 
In the AMECO database release used to retrieve final data (Autumn 2007 vintage), a few 
countries still do not have time series for ESA95 fiscal variables dating back to the eighties. In 
these cases, series for B, E, R and I were completed backwards using annual changes (in p.p. of 
GDP) from ESA79 data (and thus preserving accounting identities). Data for Germany refers to 
the western lander only until 1990 (fiscal variables relative to GDP) or 1991 (GDP growth). 
                                                 
24 The ensuing measurement error should be of second-order magnitude, since public debt is largely pre-
determined and the implicit interest rate on public debt is generally less volatile than short-term (or even long-
term) interest rates. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of alternative output gap estimates 
(EU15, 1987-2006, final data) 
   No. 
Obs.  Mean  Std. 
Error  Min. Max. 
CF output gap  300 -0,02 1,31 -3,70 5,96 
HP output gap  300 0,15 2,22 -7,52 8,80 
PF output gap  300 -0,04 2,06 -7,63 6,91 
CF: Christiano-Fitzgerald; HP: Hodrick-Prescott; PF: production 
function. The HP-based and PF-based output gaps are estimated by the 
Commission (variables AVGDGT and AVGDGP in the AMECO 
database, respectively). 
 
Table 2. Mean absolute revisions (1987-2006) 









Belgium  0.32 0.53 0.48 0.74 0.90 1.34 1.04  1.63
Denmark  0.25 0.61 0.80 1.29 1.15 1.60 1.12  1.19
Germany  0.33 0.80 0.85 0.66 0.90 1.13 1.21  1.25
Greece  0.54 0.66 1.64 2.32 2.19 3.90 2.65  3.66
Spain  0.39 0.48 0.64 0.66 0.65 1.35 0.99  1.26
France  0.29 0.51 0.50 0.80 0.40 0.90 0.70  0.65
Ireland  0.54 1.07 0.96 0.84 1.20 1.38 1.37  1.24
Italy  0.27 0.51 0.59 0.78 0.59 0.95 0.72  0.63
Luxemburg  0.40 1.41 1.36 1.48 2.52 5.09 2.07  5.93
Netherlands  0.41 0.57 0.63 0.94 0.72 1.27 0.88  1.42
Austria  0.23 0.48 0.42 0.44 1.17 1.25 0.95  1.27
Portugal  0.40 0.75 1.08 1.11 1.41 2.15 1.56  1.88
Finland  0.40 0.72 0.56 0.90 1.17 1.01 1.27  1.39
Sweden  0.23 0.58 0.78 1.10 1.17 1.39 0.95  0.87
United Kingdom  0.36 0.55 0.75 0.71 0.51 1.05 0.87  1.43
EU15  0.36 0.69 0.82 0.99 1.09 1.71 1.23  1.70
For variable X, X
t,t-1 denotes the difference (in absolute terms) between current-year estimates and one-year-
ahead forecasts, and X
07,t denotes the difference (in absolute terms) between final data (Autumn 2007 vintage) 
and current-year estimates. Differences are given in p.p. of GDP (potential GDP in the case of output gaps). 
 
 
Table 3. Correlations between revisions (EU15, 1987-2006) 
Variable X ∆CAPB  ∆CAR  ∆CAPE 
corr (GAP
t,t-1,X
t,t-1)  -0.18 -0.13 0.06
corr (GAP
07,t,X
07,t)  -0.31 0.02 0.32
See notes under Table 2. First differences are defined 







t i CAPB CAPB CAPB 1 , , , − − = ∆ .   19
Table 4. Fiscal reaction functions: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (5), ∆CAPB as dependent variable) 
   Forecasts  Estimates  Provisional data  Final data 
   (s = -1)  (s = 0)  (s = 1)  (s+t = 2007) 
Lagged output gap  0.41*** 0.33*** 0.27*** 0.08 
(7.99) (5.54) (4.65) (1.13) 
Positive lagged 
output gap 
 0.35*** 0.19* 0.10   -0.01
 (3.17) (1.66) (0.93)   (-0.05)
Negative lagged 
output gap 
 0.45*** 0.48*** 0.46***   0.18
 (4.73) (3.82) (3.89)  (1.38)
Lagged dependent 
variable 
-0.16*** -0.16*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25***
(-6.57) (-6.58) (-5.78) (-5.90) (-6.29) (-6.54) (-6.52) (-6.67)
Lagged debt  0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(1.63) (1.60) (3.55) (3.51) (2.82) (2.95) (3.34) (3.35)
Elections  -0.00 0.00 -0.46*** -0.46*** -0.51*** -0.52*** -0.55***  -0.54***
(-0.04) (0.03) (-2.97) (-2.95) (-3.19) (-3.17) (-3.94)  (-3.92)
Maastricht (lagged) -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.41*** -0.43*** -0.62*** -0.65*** -0.49*** -0.50***
(-3.91) (-3.94) (-3.05) (-3.27) (-4.69) (-5.00) (-3.66) (-3.70)
SGP (lagged)  -0.33* -0.32* -0.54* -0.50 -0.34 -0.29 0.00  0.04
(-1.80) (-1.71) (-1.67) (-1.54) (-0.90) (-0.77) (0.01)  (0.10)
No. Obs.  272 272 272 272 270 270 296 296
R
2  0.47 0.47 0.40 0.41 0.33 0.34 0.25 0.26
Estimation method: least squares dummy variables with robust standard errors. Country fixed 
effects are not reported. Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. T-statistics are given in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the squared correlation 
coefficient of actual and fitted values.   20
Table 5. Fiscal reaction functions: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (5), ∆CAR as dependent variable) 
   Forecasts  Estimates  Provisional data  Final data 
   (s = -1)  (s = 0)  (s = 1)  (s+t = 2007) 
Lagged output gap  0.09** 0.11* 0.14*** 0.17*** 
(2.01) (1.76) (2.66) (3.16) 
Positive lagged 
output gap 
 0.02 0.08 0.14   0.26***
 (0.16) (0.59) (1.38)  (2.93)
Negative lagged 
output gap 
 0.14* 0.14 0.14   0.07
 (1.87) (1.21) (1.21)  (0.73)
Lagged dependent 
variable 
-0.05*** -0.05*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.17*** -0.17***
(-3.32) (-3.39) (-3.35) (-3.35) (-3.49) (-3.41) (-5.16) (-5.08)
Lagged debt  -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.01
(-0.54) (-0.56) (1.25) (1.24) (0.57) (0.57) (0.99)  (1.04)
Elections  0.03 0.04 -0.19 -0.19 -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.27**  -0.28**
(0.31) (0.39) (-1.54) (-1.54) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.01)  (-2.07)
Maastricht (lagged) -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.29** -0.29** -0.35** -0.35** -0.40*** -0.40***
(-4.67) (-4.75) (-2.36) (-2.42) (-2.44) (-2.48) (-3.30) (-3.26)
SGP (lagged)  -0.50** -0.49** -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.14 -0.14 -0.20  -0.23
(-2.37) (-2.38) (-3.39) (-3.29) (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.65) (-0.75)
No. Obs.  272 272 272 272 270 270 296 296
R
2  0.32 0.32 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21
Estimation method: least squares dummy variables with robust standard errors. Country fixed 
effects are not reported. Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. T-statistics are given in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the squared correlation 
coefficient of actual and fitted values.   21
Table 6. Fiscal reaction functions: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (5), ∆CAPE as dependent variable) 
   Forecasts  Estimates  Provisional data  Final data 
   (s = -1)  (s = 0)  (s = 1)  (s+t = 2007) 
Lagged output gap  -0.33*** -0.22*** -0.11** 0.11 
(-7.82) (-4.21) (-2.14) (1.50) 
Positive lagged 
output gap 
 -0.40*** -0.17* -0.03   0.27**
 (-3.78) (-1.68) (-0.39)   (1.98)
Negative lagged 
output gap 
 -0.29*** -0.27*** -0.20**   -0.06
 (-4.05) (-2.86) (-2.00)  (-0.60)
Lagged dependent 
variable 
-0.06*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.08**  -0.08**
(-4.56) (-4.55) (-3.62) (-3.64) (-3.30) (-3.32) (-2.42) (-2.50)
Lagged debt  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***  -0.02***
(-1.41) (-1.45) (-1.46) (-1.43) (-2.64) (-2.71) (-2.74) (-2.79)
Elections  0.08 0.09 0.30** 0.30** 0.13 0.13 0.34***  0.32***
(0.83) (0.90) (2.40) (2.41) (1.03) (1.05) (2.66) (2.66)
Maastricht (lagged) 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.28** 0.29** 0.13 0.13
(1.36) (1.34) (1.13) (1.19) (2.44) (2.57) (0.99) (1.02)
SGP (lagged)  0.05 0.06 0.19 0.18 0.43 0.41 0.18 0.11
(0.24) (0.30) (0.62) (0.58) (1.61) (1.54) (0.48) (0.31)
No. Obs.  272 272 272 272 270 270 296 296
R
2  0.38 0.38 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22
Estimation method: least squares dummy variables with robust standard errors. Country fixed 
effects are not reported. Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. T-statistics are given in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the squared correlation 
coefficient of actual and fitted values.   22
Table 7. Fiscal reaction functions: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (5), ∆CAPB as dependent variable) 
   Forecasts  Estimates  Provisional data  Final data 
   (s = -1)  (s = 0)  (s = 1)  (s+t = 2007) 
Output gap  0.68***   0.96***   0.63***   0.20  
(6.79)   (5.26)   (4.43)   (1.40)  
Positive output gap   0.56   1.21   1.01    -2.25 
 (1.08)   (1.01)   (1.28)    (-1.06) 
Negative output gap    0.72***   0.76   0.33   3.26 
 (3.01)   (0.85)   (0.41)   (1.36) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
-0.14*** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.29*** 
(-4.60) (-4.37) (-3.47) (-3.30) (-8.63) (-6.23) (-8.24) (-4.07) 
Lagged debt  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.02*** 0.01 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.76) (0.79) (0.52) (0.22) (2.73) (0.84) 
Elections  0.05  0.06 -0.42** -0.41**  -0.45*** -0.39**  -0.51*** -0.91** 
(0.34)  (0.40) (-2.40) (-2.41) (-2.92) (-2.14) (-3.54) (-1.97) 
Maastricht (lagged)  -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.53*** -0.54*** -0.65*** -0.66*** -0.54***  -0.51 
(-2.59) (-2.59) (-3.54) (-3.49) (-5.38) (-5.07) (-4.32) (-1.42) 
SGP (lagged)  -0.24 -0.21  -0.68* -0.76 -0.05 -0.24 -0.19  0.89 
(-0.91) (-0.69) (-1.69) (-1.39) (-0.17) (-0.51) (-0.54)  (0.73) 
No. Obs.  272 272 272 272 264 264 290 290 
R
2  0.21 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.09 
Hansen J (p-value)  0.42 0.43 0.83 0.93 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.27 
Estimation method: GMM. The output gap is instrumented with its own lag (considering separately 
positive and negative values in even columns) and with a GDP-weighted average of other countries’ lagged 
gaps, all from the same data vintage (see text for further details). Country fixed effects are not reported. 
Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are given 
in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values. The value 
of the Hansen J statistic sometimes proved sensitive to the presence of outliers, which made me re-estimate 
the four final columns excluding the observations corresponding to the 1
st and the 100
th percentiles of the 
residuals distribution. Even with this correction, the results for final data should be regarded with caution, 
as the exogeneity of instruments is problematic (next to last column) and the precision of estimates with 
positive versus negative gaps split is poor (last column).    23
 
Table 8. Fiscal reaction functions: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (5), ∆CAR as dependent variable) 
   Forecasts  Estimates  Provisional data  Final data 
   (s = -1)  (s = 0)  (s = 1)  (s+t = 2007) 
Output gap  0.16** 0.36** 0.30** 0.37*** 
(2.07) (2.05) (2.24) (3.12) 
Positive output gap   0.09 1.29 0.94  1.40
 (0.25) (1.24) (1.33)  (0.92)
Negative output gap   0.19 -0.29 -0.44   -1.02
 (1.12) (-0.41) (-0.55)   (-0.56)
Lagged dependent 
variable 
-0.05*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.07* -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.15*** -0.16***
(-3.08) (-3.09) (-2.65) (-1.86) (-3.41) (-2.58) (-4.21) (-3.79)
Lagged debt  -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01
(-0.85) (-0.93) (0.39) (0.30) (0.44) (0.19) (0.32)  (0.92)
Elections  0.05 0.04 -0.15 -0.17 -0.43*** -0.33* -0.23  -0.01
(0.51) (0.41) (-1.17) (-1.26) (-2.62) (-1.79) (-1.53)  (-0.03)
Maastricht (lagged)  -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.34** -0.39*** -0.34** -0.35** -0.46*** -0.47**
(-4.37) (-4.56) (-2.44) (-2.61) (-2.24) (-2.16) (-3.39) (-2.46)
SGP (lagged)  -0.47** -0.45** -0.59*** -0.84** -0.10 -0.39 -0.27  -0.76
(-2.33) (-2.17) (-3.41) (-2.55) (-0.31) (-0.79) (-0.91) (-0.90)
No. Obs.  272 272 272 272 270 270 296 296
R
2  0.26 0.26 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.04
Hansen J (p-value)  0.36 0.25 0.18 0.40 0.06 0.21 0.17 0.23
Estimation method: GMM. The output gap is instrumented with its own lag (considering separately 
positive and negative values in even columns) and with a GDP-weighted average of other countries’ lagged 
gaps, all from the same data vintage (see text for further details). Country fixed effects are not reported. 
Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are given 
in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values. The 
precision of estimates with positive versus negative gaps split is generally poor.   24
Table 9. Fiscal reaction functions: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (5), ∆CAPE as dependent variable) 
   Forecasts  Estimates  Provisional data  Final data 
   (s = -1)  (s = 0)  (s = 1)  (s+t = 2007) 
Output gap  -0.52*** -0.61*** -0.29** 0.29* 
(-6.86) (-4.17) (-2.23) (1.84) 
Positive output gap   -0.69* -0.68 -0.20   3.65
 (-1.76) (-0.87) (-0.39)   (1.38)
Negative output 
gap 
 -0.41** -0.51 -0.42   -3.88
 (-2.25) (-0.90) (-0.73)   (-1.25)
Lagged dependent 
variable 
-0.06*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.07  -0.10
(-3.61) (-3.60) (-3.38) (-3.44) (-3.40) (-3.45) (-1.61)  (-1.19)
Lagged debt  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01** -0.02**  0.01
(-0.21) (-0.38) (-0.23) (-0.22) (-2.08) (-2.04) (-2.48)  (0.21)
Elections  0.01 0.03 0.25* 0.25* 0.14 0.15 0.44***  1.04
(0.12) (0.29) (1.92) (1.92) (1.06) (1.11) (3.09)  (1.45)
Maastricht (lagged) 0.05 0.04 0.21* 0.20* 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.07  -0.13
(0.48) (0.38) (1.68) (1.66) (2.63) (2.70) (0.51)  (-0.30)
SGP (lagged)  -0.07 -0.04 0.24 0.26 0.44 0.41 0.19  -1.53
(-0.28) (-0.15) (0.68) (0.62) (1.58) (1.17) (0.53)  (-0.96)
No. Obs.  272 272 272 272 270 270 296  296
R
2  0.20 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.16  0.03
Hansen J (p-value)  0.24 0.11 0.65 0.47 0.18 0.12 0.01  0.41
Estimation method: GMM. The output gap is instrumented with its own lag (considering separately 
positive and negative values in even columns) and with a GDP-weighted average of other countries’ lagged 
gaps, all from the same data vintage (see text for further details). Country fixed effects are not reported. 
Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are given 
in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values. As in Table 
7 above, the results for final data should be regarded with caution, as the exogeneity of instruments is 
problematic (next to last column) and the precision of estimates with positive versus negative gaps split is 
poor (last column).   25
Table 10. Deviations from budgetary plans: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (7), ∆CAPB update as dependent variable) 
Output gap update  -0.36     -0.30    
(-1.54)   (-1.31)  
Positive output gap 
update 
 -0.69   -0.42 
 (-1.38)   (-0.90) 
Negative output gap 
update 
 1.10   0.08 
 (0.56)   (0.04) 
Lagged debt update  0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 
(0.99) (0.46) (1.59) (1.18) 
Early elections  -0.49** -0.52** -0.51** -0.50** 
(-2.33) (-2.39) (-2.32) (-2.31) 
Maastricht update 
(lagged) 
-1.04*** -1.11***  -0.93**  -0.88** 
(-2.98) (-3.15) (-2.49) (-2.30) 
SGP update (lagged)  -1.93 -1.73  -1.98* -1.82 
(-1.51) (-1.49) (-1.65) (-1.60) 
Output gap forecast        0.18**    
   (2.38)  
Positive output gap 
forecast 
    -0.01 
    (-0.04) 
Negative output gap 
forecast 
    0.27** 
    (2.19) 
Regular elections     -0.29**  -0.27** 
   (-2.22)  (-2.07) 
No. Obs.  235 235 235 235 
R
2  0.16 0.16 0.20 0.22 
Hansen J (p-value)  0.41 0.59 0.69 0.71 
Estimation method: GMM. The output gap update is instrumented with 
its own lag (considering separately positive and negative values in even 
columns) and with a GDP-weighted average of other countries’ 
contemporary gap updates, all from the same pair of data vintages (see 
text for further details). Country fixed effects are not reported. Asterisks 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. T-statistics are given in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the 
squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values.   26
Table 11. Deviations from budgetary plans: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (7), ∆CAR update as dependent variable) 
Output gap update  -0.35*     -0.32    
(-1.69)   (-1.57)  
Positive output gap 
update 
 -0.61   -0.44 
 (-1.00)   (-0.81) 
Negative output gap 
update 
 1.24   0.77 
 (0.58)   (0.38) 
Lagged debt update  0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 
(1.25) (0.61) (1.63) (1.15) 
Early elections  -0.25 -0.23 -0.21 -0.19 
(-1.61) (-1.42) (-1.38) (-1.19) 
Maastricht update 
(lagged) 
0.15 0.15 0.29 0.31 
(0.27) (0.25) (0.46) (0.49) 
SGP update (lagged)  -2.44*** -2.23*** -2.32*** -2.18*** 
(-3.79) (-3.17) (-3.57) (-3.20) 
Output gap forecast        0.14**    
   (2.11)  
Positive output gap 
forecast 
    0.12 
    (0.47) 
Negative output gap 
forecast 
    0.15 
    (1.28) 
Regular elections     0.05  0.02 
   (0.41)  (0.16) 
No. Obs.  235 235 235 235 
R
2  0.18 0.14 0.20 0.18 
Hansen J (p-value)  0.32 0.03 0.19 0.01 
Estimation method: GMM. The output gap update is instrumented with 
its own lag (considering separately positive and negative values in even 
columns) and with a GDP-weighted average of other countries’ 
contemporary gap updates, all from the same pair of data vintages (see 
text for further details). Country fixed effects are not reported. Asterisks 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. T-statistics are given in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the 
squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values. Results with 
positive versus negative gaps split should be regarded with caution, as 
the exogeneity of instruments is problematic and the precision of 
estimates declines.   27
Table 12. Deviations from budgetary plans: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (7), ∆CAPE update as dependent variable) 
Output gap update  -0.10     -0.10    
(-0.53)   (-0.51)  
Positive output gap 
update 
 -0.10   -0.13 
 (-0.23)   (-0.32) 
Negative output gap 
update 
 0.22   0.30 
 (0.17)   (0.25) 
Lagged debt update  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
(0.36) (0.34) (0.27) (0.34) 
Early elections  0.08 0.13 0.12 0.15 
(0.50) (0.77) (0.76) (0.92) 
Maastricht update 
(lagged) 
0.38 0.62 0.46 0.62 
(0.91) (1.28) (1.13) (1.38) 
SGP update (lagged)  0.30 0.28 0.41 0.31 
(0.30) (0.25) (0.44) (0.31) 
Output gap forecast        -0.02    
   (-0.45)  
Positive output gap 
forecast 
    0.09 
    (0.49) 
Negative output gap 
forecast 
    -0.10 
    (-1.19) 
Regular elections     0.29***  0.29*** 
   (2.92)  (2.84) 
No. Obs.  229 229 229 229 
R
2  0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17 
Hansen J (p-value)  0.07 0.02 0.10 0.04 
Estimation method: GMM. The output gap update is instrumented with 
its own lag (considering separately positive and negative values in even 
columns) and with a GDP-weighted average of other countries’ 
contemporary gap updates, all from the same pair of data vintages (see 
text for further details). Country fixed effects are not reported. Asterisks 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. T-statistics are given in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the 
squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values. The value of 
the Hansen J statistic sometimes proved sensitive to the presence of 
outliers, which made me re-estimate the four columns excluding the 
observations corresponding to the 1
st and the 100
th percentiles of the 
residuals distribution. Even with this correction, results should be 
regarded with caution, as the exogeneity of instruments remains 





Table A1. Fiscal reaction functions with alternative output gaps and budgetary sensitivity 
parameters: EU15, 1987-2006 (equation (5), final data) 
Dep. variable  ∆CAPB  ∆CAR  ∆CAPE 
Output gap estimate  CF  PF  PF  CF  PF  PF  CF  PF  PF 
Time-varying ε
R, ε
E?  N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Lagged output gap  0.08 0.07 0.06 0.17*** 0.09** 0.08** 0.11 0.04 0.04
(1.13) (1.61) (1.50) (3.16) (2.32) (2.20) (1.50) (1.22) (1.25)
Lagged dependent 
variable 
-0.25*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.08** -0.10*** -0.10***
(-6.52) (-8.54) (-8.55) (-5.16) (-5.22) (-5.37) (-2.42) (-3.59) (-3.61)
Lagged debt  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02*** -0.01* -0.01*
(3.34) (3.20) (3.18) (0.99) (1.60) (1.55) (-2.74)  (-1.88)  (-1.86)
Elections  -0.55*** -0.54*** -0.55*** -0.27** -0.28** -0.29** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.32***
(-3.94) (-3.95) (-4.07) (-2.01) (-2.10) (-2.16) (2.66)  (2.66)  (2.70)
Maastricht (lagged)  -0.49*** -0.69*** -0.67*** -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.39*** 0.13 0.25* 0.24*
(-3.66) (-5.05) (-4.91) (-3.30) (-3.26) (-3.12) (0.99)  (1.87)  (1.83)
SGP (lagged)  0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.20 -0.06 -0.06 0.18  0.41  0.40
(0.01) (-0.05) (-0.02) (-0.65) (-0.19) (-0.18) (0.48)  (1.21)  (1.20)
No. Obs.  296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
R
2  0.25 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.20
Estimation method: least squares dummy variables with robust standard errors. Country fixed effects are not 
reported. Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are 
given in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values. CF denotes 
the Christiano-Fitzgerald output gap (used elsewhere in the paper), and PF stands for the production function-
based output gap estimated by the Commission (variable AVGDGP in the AMECO database). When time-
varying, the budgetary sensitivity parameters ε
R and ε
E are those implicit in the cyclically-adjusted revenue and 
primary expenditure computed by the Commission (variables URTGAP and UUTGBP in the AMECO database). 
In all cases variables CAPB, CAR and CAPE were recomputed (excluding UMTS proceeds) through equations (1) 
to (3) with the appropriate output gap and sensitivity parameters.   29
Table A2. Expenditure reaction functions with GAP split into quartiles: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (5), ∆CAPE as dependent variable) 
   Forecasts  Estimates  Prov. data  Final data 
   (s = -1)  (s = 0)  (s = 1)  (s+t = 2007) 
Lagged output gap: 
1st quartile 
-0.28*** -0.25** -0.18 -0.09 
(-4.05) (-2.56) (-1.60) (-0.82) 
Lagged output gap: 
2nd quartile 
-0.26 -1.22** 0.29 -0.21 
(-0.99) (-2.22) (0.57) (-0.58) 
Lagged output gap: 
3rd quartile 
-0.32 -0.47* -0.16 0.61 
(-1.26) (-1.76) (-0.51) (1.09) 
Lagged output gap: 
4th quartile 
-0.43*** -0.13 -0.06 0.29* 
(-4.49) (-1.24) (-0.71) (1.93) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
-0.07*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.08** 
(-4.77) (-3.57) (-3.31) (-2.57) 
Lagged debt  -0.01 -0.01 -0.02*** -0.02*** 
(-1.60) (-1.49) (-2.75) (-2.81) 
Elections  0.09 0.31** 0.13 0.32*** 
(0.97) (2.49) (1.02) (2.61) 
Maastricht (lagged)  0.10 0.14 0.28** 0.13 
(1.23) (1.22) (2.51) (1.02) 
SGP (lagged)  0.01 0.20 0.39 0.12 
(0.06) (0.68) (1.43) (0.34) 
No. Obs.  272 272 270 296 
R
2  0.40 0.24 0.21 0.22 
Estimation method: least squares dummy variables with robust standard errors. 
Country fixed effects are not reported. Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are given in parentheses. R
2 is 
computed as the squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values.   30
Table A3. Fiscal reaction functions excluding one-offs: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (5), ∆CAPB as dependent variable) 
   Forecasts  Estimates  Provisional data  Final data 
   (s = -1)  (s = 0)  (s = 1)  (s+t = 2007) 
Lagged output gap  0.40*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.04 
(6.67) (5.38) (3.36) (0.55) 
Positive lagged 
output gap 
 0.42*** 0.25** 0.02   -0.08
 (3.87) (2.09) (0.12)   (-0.71)
Negative lagged 
output gap 
 0.39*** 0.47*** 0.54***   0.18
 (3.45) (3.24) (3.89)  (1.35)
Lagged dependent 
variable 
-0.15*** -0.15*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.26***
(-5.94) (-5.90) (-6.68) (-6.76) (-8.17) (-8.58) (-5.95) (-6.09)
Lagged debt  0.01* 0.01* 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***  0.02***
(1.79) (1.79) (3.70) (3.61) (2.78) (2.97) (3.38) (3.39)
Elections  -0.09 -0.09 -0.43** -0.44** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.60***  -0.58***
(-0.84) (-0.82) (-2.57) (-2.56) (-2.84) (-2.81) (-4.19) (-4.15)
Maastricht (lagged) -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.30** -0.32** -0.45*** -0.46*** -0.31**  -0.30**
(-3.03) (-3.01) (-2.31) (-2.50) (-3.50) (-3.73) (-2.25) (-2.19)
SGP (lagged)  -0.33* -0.33* -0.69* -0.67* -0.56 -0.48 -0.14  -0.08
(-1.76) (-1.80) (-1.72) (-1.65) (-1.22) (-1.05) (-0.34) (-0.21)
No. Obs.  239 239 238 238 235 235 261 261
R
2  0.47 0.47 0.41 0.42 0.34 0.35 0.26 0.27
Estimation method: least squares dummy variables with robust standard errors. Country fixed 
effects are not reported. Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. T-statistics are given in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the squared correlation 
coefficient of actual and fitted values.   31
Table A4. Fiscal reaction functions excluding one-offs: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (5), ∆CAR as dependent variable) 
   Forecasts  Estimates  Provisional data  Final data 
   (s = -1)  (s = 0)  (s = 1)  (s+t = 2007) 
Lagged output gap  0.05 0.13** 0.17*** 0.18*** 
(0.95) (2.22) (2.70) (3.11) 
Positive lagged 
output gap 
 0.07 0.17 0.12   0.27***
 (0.64) (1.33) (1.01)  (2.86)
Negative lagged 
output gap 
 0.03 0.09 0.23*  0.08
 (0.38) (0.71) (1.90)  (0.70)
Lagged dependent 
variable 
-0.05*** -0.05*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.20*** -0.20***
(-2.86) (-2.85) (-3.12) (-3.08) (-3.58) (-3.56) (-5.11) (-5.05)
Lagged debt  -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01
(-0.31) (-0.31) (1.24) (1.25) (0.85) (0.88) (1.12)  (1.17)
Elections  -0.02 -0.02 -0.21* -0.21* -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.34**  -0.35***
(-0.15) (-0.17) (-1.66) (-1.66) (-2.58) (-2.58) (-2.48) (-2.59)
Maastricht (lagged) -0.30** -0.30** -0.42** -0.41** -0.28* -0.28* -0.19  -0.20
(-2.46) (-2.45) (-2.39) (-2.37) (-1.85) (-1.92) (-1.25) (-1.27)
SGP (lagged)  -0.43** -0.44** -0.55*** -0.56*** -0.15 -0.14 -0.48  -0.52*
(-2.05) (-2.05) (-2.80) (-2.77) (-0.43) (-0.38) (-1.58) (-1.70)
No. Obs.  239 239 238 238 235 235 261 261
R
2  0.27 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21
Estimation method: least squares dummy variables with robust standard errors. Country fixed 
effects are not reported. Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. T-statistics are given in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the squared correlation 
coefficient of actual and fitted values.   32
Table A5. Fiscal reaction functions excluding one-offs: EU15, 1987-2006 
(equation (5), ∆CAPE as dependent variable) 
   Forecasts  Estimates  Provisional data  Final data 
   (s = -1)  (s = 0)  (s = 1)  (s+t = 2007) 
Lagged output gap  -0.38*** -0.25*** -0.09 0.14* 
(-8.29) (-3.97) (-1.45) (1.83) 
Positive lagged 
output gap 
 -0.44*** -0.18 0.01   0.34**
 (-4.02) (-1.50) (0.12)   (2.64)
Negative lagged 
output gap 
 -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.21*   -0.09
 (-4.69) (-2.99) (-1.80)  (-0.92)
Lagged dependent 
variable 
-0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05** -0.05** -0.08*** -0.08** -0.07**  -0.07**
(-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.20) (-2.23) (-2.61) (-2.57) (-2.05) (-2.15)
Lagged debt  -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02***
(-2.07) (-2.12) (-2.21) (-2.14) (-2.50) (-2.60) (-3.02) (-3.15)
Elections  0.12 0.13 0.28** 0.28** 0.14 0.14 0.36***  0.34***
(1.18) (1.25) (2.00) (2.02) (0.98) (1.00) (2.72) (2.69)
Maastricht (lagged)  0.19* 0.19* -0.00 0.01 0.25* 0.26* 0.25* 0.23*
(1.78) (1.74) (-0.02) (0.06) (1.66) (1.74) (1.88) (1.78)
SGP (lagged)  0.09 0.10 0.31 0.29 0.51** 0.47** -0.07  -0.15
(0.49) (0.53) (0.98) (0.92) (2.12) (2.00) (-0.19)  (-0.44)
No. Obs.  239 239 238 238 235 235 261 261
R
2  0.42 0.43 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.26
Estimation method: least squares dummy variables with robust standard errors. Country fixed 
effects are not reported. Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. T-statistics are given in parentheses. R
2 is computed as the squared correlation 
coefficient of actual and fitted values. 
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